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[Crim. No. 6786. In Bank. Nov. 2, 1961.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALBERT
ERNEST LOVE, Defendant and Appellant.
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[1] Criminal Law-Judgment--Procedure for Determining Penalty.
-On retrial by jury on the issue of penalty following an
adjudication that defendant was guilty of first degree murder,
it was proper procedure to permit the prosecutor to open and
close the penalty trial and argument to the jury.
[2] Id.-Judgment--E1fect.-On retrial by jury on the issue of
penalty following an adjudication that defendant was guilty
of first degree murder and was sane at the time of commission
of the offense, defendant cannot reopen the question of his
sanity at the time of commission of the offense, the adjudication as to the issue of insanity having been affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 270 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4, 8] Criminal Law, § 1011.1; [2]
Criminal Law, § 1018; [5] Criminal Law, § 97; [6] Jury, § 103(7);
[7] Criminal Law, § 1390; [9] Homicide,§ 88; [10] Homicide,
§ 236; [11] Homicide, § 242; Criminal Law, § 934; [12] Homicide,
§ 273; [13] Homicide, § 242; [14, 15] Criminal Law, § 934; [16, 20]
Criminal Law, § 617; [17, 23] Criminal Law, §§ 622, 623; [18]
Criminal Law, § 618; [19] Criminal Law, §§ 619, 620; [21, 22]
Criminal Law, § 632; [24] Evidence, § 12; [25] Criminal Law,
§ 622; [26] Criminal Law, § 1099; [27, 29] Criminal Law, § 1404
(19); [28] Criminal Law, § 1407(15).

I
i

!
I

I

I
j
Nov. 19611
[58

d'.Jd

PEOPLE tI. LoVE
'flO; 18 Cal.Rptr. 'l77. 17 Cal.Rptr. 481. 366 P.2d 33. 109]

721

[8] ld. - Judgment - Procedure for Determining Penalty.-On a
penalty trial following an adjudication that defendant was
guilty of first degree murder, the court did not err in dismissing defendant's subpoena for the Governor and a prison
warden, where defendant voluntarily dismissed the subpoena
for the warden, and where the Governor was subpoenaed to
elicit his views on capital punishment, and the penalties for
first degree murder have been fixed by the Legislature (Pen.
Code, § 190). The wisdom or deterrent effect of those penalties
are for the Legislature to determine and are not justiciable
issues; evidence as to these matters is inadmissible.
[4] Id.-Judgment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-Juries
in capital cases cannot become legislatures ad hoc, and trials
on the issue of penalty cannot be converted into legislative
hearings.
(5) Id.-Venue-Change of Venue-Discretion.-An application
for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse
of discretion is shown.
[6) Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-The court
in a murder case did not err in excusing prospective jurors
conscientiously opposed to capital punishment.
[7] Oriminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Jury-Ohallenges.Where both sides, during selection of the jury, "passed" the
jury as presently constituted, and thereafter both the prosecutor and defendant continued to exercise peremptory challenges, with no objection to their doing so, defendant could
not have been prejudiced thereby.
r8] ld.-Judgment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-Where
photographs of the victim in an uxoricide case were not exceptionally gruesome and tended to prove how the shooting
occurred and to corroborate evidence that defendant intentionally held the gun close to his wife's body to avoid injuring
others, these facts were relevant to punishment as well as to
guilt.
[9] Homicide-Evidence-Punishment.-Evidence of the minimum,
average and maximum terms actually being served by persons
convicted of first degree murder is admissible.
[10] ld.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury in a murder case
may be instructed on the minimum time that must be served
before a prisoner will be eligible for parole, and that the actual
period of parole depends on a number of factors, including his
criminal record and his behavior in prison.
[11] ld.-Punishment: Oriminal Law - Verdict - Modification.Although the jury in a jury trial has exclusive power in the
first instance to select the penalty for first degree murder as
between death and life imprisonment, this does not affect the
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power of the trial court, in disposing of defendant's motion for
new trial, to reduce the punishment from death to life imprisonment. Based on its own independent view of the evidence, the trial court is not only empowered to reduce the
degree or class of the offense, but is also empowered to reduce I
the penalty imposed.
'
[12] Id.-Appeal-Modi1l.cation of Judgment.-The Supreme Court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact as
to choice of punishment for first degree murder even where
it may doubt the appropriateness of the death penalty.
[1S] Id.-Punishment.-Only the trial court has power to reduce
the punishment originally selected by the trier of fact for
first degree murder.
[14] Criminal Law-Vernict-Modification.-The trial court in a
murder case not only has the power to reduce the penalty,
but the duty to review the evidence and determine whether in
its judgment the weight of the evidence supports the jury's
verdict. In performing that duty the trial court must judge
the credibility of witnesses, determine the probative force of
testimony and weigh the evidence.
[15] Id.-Verdict-Modification.-On defendant's motion to reduce
the penalty from death to life imprisonment in a murder case,
the trial court erred in giving weight to the jury verdict
that had been set aside on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence and to the jury verdict that had been set aside because of the admission of prejudicial evidence. Although the
court eould properly consider the jury verdict in the present
case, it could not rely on that verdict alone and thus shift its
own responsibility to the jury; it had an independent responsibility to give defendant and the People the benefit of its own
judgment as to whether or not the death penalty was proper.
[16] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Counsel's summation to
the jury must be based solely on those matters of fact of
which evidence has already been introduced or of which no
evidence need be introduced because of their notoriety as
judicially noticed facts.
[17] Id.-Argument of Counsel-IDustrations-Matters of Common Knowledge.-Counsel may during argument state matters
not in evidence that are common knowledge or are illustrations
drawn from common experience, history or literature.
[18] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Reference to Extraneous Matters.
-Counsel may not, under the guise of argument, assert as
facts matters not in evidence or excluded because inadmissible.
[19] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Inferences: Opinions as to Guilt.
-Counsel may not use evidence offered for a special purpose,
[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 430 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 463.
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such as cl'edibility or state of mind, to argue inferences for
which the evidence is inadmissible, and. he may not argue his
own belief of guilt based on evidence not produced in court.
[20] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Counsel may not use
arguments calculated to mislead the jury or that appeal pri. maril;r to passion or prejudice.
[21] Id. - Argument of Counsel- Comment on Punishment.Statements of prosecutors that it is necessary swiftly and
severely to punish the guilty are usually considered within the
bounds of proper argument.
[22] Id. - Argument of Connsel- Penalty Phase of Case.-The
prosecutor may not in his argument in a murder case state as
a fact that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent
than imprisonment, since the Legislature has left to the absolute discretion of the jury the fixing of punishment for first
degree murder. There is thus no legislative finding, and it is
not a matter of common knowledge, that capital punishment
is or is not a more effective deterrent than imprisonment; since
evidence on this question is inadmissible, argument thereon by
prosecution or defense could serve no nseful purpose, is apt
to be misleading, and is therefore improper (Overruling
People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 766-768 [306 P.2d 463], insofar as it is inconsistent with this conclusion.)
[28a, 2Sb] Id.-Argument of Counsel-IDustrations-Matters of
Oommon Knowledge.-The prosecutor in a murder case could
not properly assert during argument without any evidence in
the record that many criminals use empty guns and that they
do so because of fear of the death penalty, relating alleged
conversations between police and criminals that were not in
evidence, since these facts were not a matter of common knowledge. The prosecutor, under guise of illustration, improperly
attempted to furnish specific facts to support his argument.
[24] Evidence--Judicial Notice.-Since judicial notice by a jury is
more limited than judicial notice by the trial court, faets are
deemed within the common knowledge of the jury only if they
are matters of common human experience or well known laws
of natural science.
[25] Oriminal Law - Argument of Counsel- IDustrations.-Although counsel may illustrate a general truth, the illustration
must not degent'rate into an improper assertion of specific
facts bearing on the case in hand.
[26] Id.-Appeal-Objections-Argument of Counsel.-A defendant who did not object to improper statements of the prosecutor during argument to the jury could not ordinarily raise
the issue of their propriety on appeal unless they were of such
charactt'r tllat the error could not have been cured by prompt
admonition and instructions of the trial court. This rule
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applies to defendants who have refused counsel as well as to
those represented by counsel.
[27] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Argument of Counsel.-The
Supreme Court in a murder case could not consider the prosecutor's improper statements of fact in the abstract, although
defendant did not object to them at the trial, where tlleY
were part and parcel of his erroneous argument with respect.
to the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
{28] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Argument of Counsel.-Even
if the argument of the prosecutor in a murder case with respect to the deterrent effect of the death penalty were otherwise proper, an admonition to disregard his improper statements of fact would not have cured the error as to that argument, where he firmly believed that the death penalty is a
more effective deterrent than imprisonment and that the facts
he advanced in support of his belief were true, and where
he would not have been willing to recant his statements had
defendant objected, and the trial court could not have labelled
them as erroneous without itself giving inadmissible hearsay
and opinion evidence in support of defendant. At most the
trial court could admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statements; it could not erase them from the jurors'
minds or explain why they should not be considered without
further magnifying their impact.
[29] Id. - Appeal- Reversible Error - Argument of Counsel.Where the prosecutor's argument in a murder ease that the
death penalty was essential to deter murder was not a minor
part of his appeal to the jury, but was one of three main points
around which he built his argument and he supported it with
statements of fact he should have known he was not entitled
to make, the error was prejudicial, and a judgment imposing
the death penalty should be reversed, it appearing that it was
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant
would have been reached in the absence of the error.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Butte
County and from an order denying a new trial. J. F. Good,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty reversed and cause remanded for retrial and
redetermination of question of penalty only and for pronouncement of new sentence and jUdgment.
Carl B. Shapiro, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
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Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant
Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
. TRAYNOR, J.-For the third time a jury has fixed defendant '8 penalty at death for the murder of his wife. He
was first tried in 1958. The jury found him guilty but could
not agree on the penalty. A second jury fixed the penalty at
death; but the trial court granted a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, and we affirmed. (PeopZe v.
Love, 51 Ca1.2d 751 [336 P.2d 169].) Defendant was again
tried in 1959 and found guilty of murder in the first degree;
again the jury fixed the penalty at death. We affirmed the
judgment as to the adjudication that defendant is guilty of
murder of the first degree and was sane at the time of the
commission of the offense. We reversed the judgment as to
the imposition of the death penalty because of the admission
of evidence tending to inflame and prejudice the jury. (People
v. Love, 53 Ca1.2d 843 [350 P.2d 705].)
Upon retrial of the issue of penalty, defendant discharged
his attorneys and conducted his own defense. The court cautioned him not to waive counsel; but defendant insisted on
defending himself. The jury again fixed the penalty at death.
This appeal from the judgment entered on the jury verdict is
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court denied him
due process by permitting the prosecutor to open and close
the penalty trial and the argument to the jury. This procedure
was expressly approved in PMple v. Corwin, 52 Ca1.2d 404,
407 [340 P.2d 626]. That case governs here, even though
a new jury was selected to consider the penalty. (People v.
Gonzalez, ante, pp. 317, 319 [14 Cal.Rptr. 639, 363 P.2d
871].)
[2] Defendant cannot reopen the question of his sanity
at the time of the commission of the offense, for the judgment
on the issue of insanity was affirmed in People v. Love, supra,
53 Ca1.2d 843, 858.
[3] The court did not err in dismissing defendant's
subpoena for Governor Brown and Warden Duffy. Defendant
voluntarily dismissed the subpoena for Warden Duffy. He
had subpoenaed Govettior Brown to elieit his views on capital
punishment. The penalties for fir!';t degree murder have been
fixed by the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 190.) The wisdom
or deterrent effect of those penalties are for the Legislature
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to determine and are therefore not justiciable issues. Hence:
evidence as to these matters is inadmissible. [4] Juries in
capital cases cannot become legislatures ad hoc, and trials on

')
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the issue of penalty cannot be converted into legislative hearings.
[ 5 ] The court did not err in denying a change of venue.
An application for change of venue is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. (People v. BurweU, 44 Ca1.2d
16, 30 [279 P.2d 744].) There has been no showing of abuse
of discretion. [ 6 ] The court did not err in excusing prospective jurors conscientiously opposed to capital punishment.
(People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 575-576 [305 P.2d 1].)
[ 7 ] During the selection of the jury both sides "passed"
the jury as presently constituted. Thereafter, both the prosecutor and the defendant continued to exercise peremptory
challenges. There was no objection to their doing so, and
defendant could not have been prejudiced thereby.
[8] Defendant objects to the introduction of two colored
photographs of the victim. In People v. Love, supra, 53 Ca1.2d
at pages 852-853, we stated" [t]he photographs in the present
ease were not exceptionally gruesome. . .. The photographs
tend to prove how the shooting occurred and corroborate
evidence that defendant intentionally held the gun close to
his wife's body to avoid injuring others." These facts are
relevant to punishment as well as to guilt. (People v. Jones,
52 Ca1.2d 636, 647 [343 P.2d 577].)
Defendant contends that the court erroneously admitted
evidence and erroneously instructed the jury on the average
time between conviction and parole of prisoners serving a
life sentence for first degree murder. He insists that parole
of prisoners differs from case to case and that statistics on
this subject are misleading.
[9] Evidence of the minimum, average and maximum
terms actually being served by persons convicted of first
degree murder is admissible. (People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871,
884-885 [346 P.2d 22].) Moreover, defendant elicited all
relevant testimony on the factors that influence parole and
that ,,"ould be considered by the Adult Authority in his case before granting him a parole. [10] The trial court instructed
the jury on the minimum period of imprisonment before defendant would be eligible for parole. It also instructed the
jury that the actual period of parole depends on a number
of factors including his criminal record and his behavior in
prison. The court then reviewed the evidence on the mean

Nov. 1961]

PEOPLE V. LOVE
(58 C.2d '120; 16 Cal.Rptr. '177. 17 Cal.Rptr. 481.366 P.2d 33. 8091

727

and median times between conviction and parole served by
prisoners sentenced to life imprisolllnent for first degree
murder. In People v. Reese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117 [301 P.2d
582], we held that a jury may be instructed on the minimum
time that must be served before a prisoner will be eligible for
parole; the instructions in the present case were more favorable to defendant.
Defendant contends that the trial court did not give proper
c·onside.ration to his motion to reduce the penalty from death
to life imprisonment.
After the jurors returned their verdict the court granted
defendant a continuance to prepare his motion for a new trial.
He then obtained counsel who presented the motion. They
urged the court to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment
on the ground that the evidence did not justify a sentence
of death. The court ruled that it did not have the power to
reduce the penalty and could grant a new trial only for errors
of law.
Defendant's counsel, invoking People v. Moore, 53 Ca1.2d
451,454 [348 P.2d 584], insisted that the court had the power
to reduce the penalty, but the court disagreed, stating: "Well,
it's [the Moore case) a little different, apparently, apparently
the remanding of the particular case was not as unlimited,
not as limited as the relflanding [of) this case." The following exchange between court and counsel ensued:
"MR. SHAPIRO: No, because the same issue is at stake,
isn't it, the only issue."
"THE COURT: Well, the conditions of the exercise of any
discretion are predicated upon either an error of law, or a
right on the part of the Court to recommend to the jury the
sentence to be imposed, being vested by statute and I don't
find that anywhere in the Penal Code under present procedure
affecting penalty trials in murder.
"MR. SHAPIRO: At the time of remanding this case, after
the remand order remanding it in the Moore case, this court,
the court in the Moore case was exactly in the same position
as the Court is today, I believe .
.. THE COURT: It is rather hard to rationalize, but-"MR. SHAPIRO: Beg pardon T
"THE COURT: The decision would be there, however, in view
of the fact that three juries have exercised their conscientious
judgment in this regard, I can't say that the death penalty
was improper in this case. The motion for a new trial will be
denied!'
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[11] In People v. Moore, supra, 53 Ca1.2d 451, 454, we
declared:
C CAlthough the jury in a jury trial has the exclusive power
in the first instance to select the penalty for first degree I
murder as between death and life imprisonment [citations], ,
this does not affect the power of a trial court, in disposing
of a defendant's motion for a new trial, to reduce the punishment 'from' death to life imprisonment. Based upon its own
independent view of the evidence, the trial court is not only
empowered to reduce the degree or class of the offense [citations], but is also empowered to reduce the penalty imposed."
(Italics added.)
The power of the trial court to review the evidence and
to reduce the penalty fixed by the jury is therefore settled.
[ 12 ] It is also settled that " '. . . This court cannot substitute its judgment as to choice of punishment [citation]
even where we may doubt the appropriateness of the death
penalty [citations].'. . . [13] Only the trial court has the
power to reduce the punishment originally selected by the trier
of fact. . . . " (People v. Bittger, 54 Ca1.2d 720, 734 [355
P.2d645].)
[14] Thus, the trial court has not only the power to
reduce the penalty but the duty to review the evidence and
to determine whether in' its judgment the weight of the
evidence supports the jury's verdict. (People v. Borchers,
50 Ca1.2d 321, 328, 330 [325 P.2d 97].) In performing
that duty the trial court must " '. . . judge the credibility
of the witnesses, determine the probative force of the testimony and weigh the evidence... .''' (People v. 8hera11, 49
Ca1.2d 101, 109 [315 P.2d 5].)
It is clear from the record in this case that the
trial court not only erred as to the scope of its power to
reduce the penalty but also failed to give defendant's motion
the consideration required by People v. Moore, and People v.
8heran. During most of the discussion of the motion the court
was of the opinion that it did not have the power to reduce
dIe penalty. At the time of the ruling on the motion, the court
still doubted that it had such power and indicated that even if
it had it would not exercise that power because three juries
had fixed the penalty at death.
[ 15 ] The trial COUl't erred in giving weight to the jury
vf'rdict that had been set aside on the grounds of ne,,,ly
discovered evidence and to the jury vel'dict that had been
set aside because of the admission of prejudicial evidencf'.

)
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Although the court could properly consider the verdict of
the jury in the present case, it could not rely on that verdict
alone and thus shift its own responsibility to the jury. It
had an independent responsibility to give defendant and the
People the benefit of its own judgment as to whether or not
the death penalty was proper.
If the only error was the failure of the trial court
properly to consider defendant's motion for a new trial, it
would be appropriate to vacate the judgment and order
denying the motion for new trial with directions to the trial
court to reconsider the motion and to enter the appropriate
judgment or order. (See People v. Moore, supra, 53 Ca1.2d
451, 452.) Since it appears, however, that the prosecutor
committed prejudicial misconduct in arguing the deterrent
effect of the death penalty to the jury, the judgment and
the order denying the motion for new trial must be reversed. 1
During closing arguments the prosecutor urged the jury
to fix the penalty at death because such penalty would serve
as a deterrent to others. The prosecutor also stated: "It is a
known fact that callous, hardened criminals when they commit
burglaries, robberies, breakins, rarely carry loads in their
pistols. . .. [W]hen men are asked after these crimes are
committed, ... 'you don't keep any loads in your gun when
you were arrested. Why is that T' Do you know that these
people say? Members of the jury, they say they know that
the law says that if they kill someone while they are in that
robbery, or that burglary, that they will get the death penalty,
and therefore thinking and reflecting on that, even while they
commit their crimes, they unload their guns and as insurance
against not getting the death penalty. . . . In other words if
there were no death penalty, if jurors did not exercise their
sound discretion in a proper case such as this and inflict it
'There is no merit in defendant's contentions that the prosecutor also
committed prejudieial miseonduet by reserving psyehiatrie testimony
for rebuttal that should ha ... e been offered, if at all, in the case in ehief
and by stating during the 'Voir dire and in Ms argument that he repre·
sented the People of the State of California.
The psyehiatric testimony was offered to rebut testimony by a defense
witness that defendant was incapable of premeditation. The issue of
defendant's eapacity to premeditate ,,'as not part of the prosecutor's
ease in cllief in the trial on the penalty. It was proper rebuttal, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
Pen. Code, ~ 1093, subd. 4; People v. Carter, 48 Ca1.2d 737, 753·754
[312 P.2d 665].) Moreover, defenilllnt did not object to its admission.
The prosecutor's statements that he represents the People of Cali·
fornia were not improper. (People v. Wrin, 50 Ca1.2d 888, 895 [826
P.2d 457].)
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and have the courage to inflict it, it would be better for a
burglar or murderer or someone committing a crime to take
a chance and kill someone.... [T]hey would know then that
they could gamble ten to twelve years against shooting someone to escape and silencing the witness, killing the policeman,
killing the clerk and getting away, but they know their life is,
paltry as they are, it keeps them in line, and gives them the
fear in their hearts that they are not going to murder innocent
people, not because they don't want to, but for plain good
business that they might gamble ten to twelve years life imprisonment on a parole to shoot someone to kill someone, but
they won't gamble their own life."
[16] Counsel's summation to the jury I I must be based
solely upon those matters of fact of which evidence has already
been introduced or of which no evidence need ever be introduced because of their notoriety as judicially noticed facts."
(6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1806, p. 269; accord
People v. Evans, 39 Cal2d 242, 251 [246 P.2d 636].) [1'1] He
may state matters not in evidence that are common knowledge,
or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history,
or literature. (People v. Gingell, 211 Cal 532, 541-542 [296
P. 70] ; People v. Molina, 126 Cal. 505, 508 [59 P. 34] ; People
v. Scarborough, 171 Cal.App.2d 186, 190 [340 P.2d 76];
People v. Travis, 129 CalApp.2d 29, 37-39 f276 P.2d 193] ;
Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury, 105 D.Pa.L.Rev. 139,
150; 1 Thompson, Trials, 814-817, 831.) [18] He may not,
however, under the guise of argument, assert as facts matters
not in evidence or excluded because inadmissible. (People v.
Kirkes, 39 Ca1.2d 719, 724 [249 P.2d 1]; People v. Evans,
supra, 39 Cal.2d 242, 251; People v. Oarr, 163 Ca1.App.2d 568,
577 [329 P.2d 746] ; People v. Whitehead, 148 Cal.App.2d 701,
705-706 [307 P.2d 442] ; People v. Vienne, 142 Cal.App.2d 172,
173-174 [297 P.2d 1027] ; People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650,
675 [245 P.2d 633] ; see 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940)
§ 1807, p. 261.) [19] He may not use evidence offered for
a special purpose, such as credibility or state of mind, to argue
inferences for which the evidence is inadmissible (People v.
Purvis, ante, pp. 93, 99 [13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d
713] ; People v. Adams, 182 Ca1.App.2d 27, 38 [5 Ca1.Rptr.
795] ; People v. Talle, sup,"a, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 675; see 6
Wigmore, Eyidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1807, p. 272), and he
may not argue his own belief of guilt baspd upon evidence
not produced in court. (People v. Kirkes, supra, 39 Ca1.2d
719, 724; People v. Edgar, 34 Cal.App. 459, 468 [167 P. 8911 ;
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see 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1806, p. 259; Stout,
AppeUate Review 0/ Orimi'1!4l Oonvictions on Appeal, 43 Cal.
L.Rev. 381, 427.) [20] Moreover, counsel may not use
arguments calculated to mislead the jury (People v. Purvis,
52 Cat2d 811, 886 [346 P.2d 22] ; People v. Oaetano, 29 Cal.
2d 616, 619-620 [177 P.2d 1] ; People v. Johnson, 178 Cal.App.
2d 360, 372 [3 Cal.Rptr. 28] ; AfJett v. Milwaukee cf; Suburban
Transport 00., 11 Wis.2d 604 [106 N.W.2d 274, 280]; see
Michael and Adler, Trial 0/ an Issue 0/ Fact, 34 Colum.L.Rev.
1224, 1483-1484) or that appeal primarily to passion or
prejudice. (People v. Wein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 397 [326 P.2d
457] ; People v. Simon, 80 Cal.App. 675, 677-679 [252 P. 758] ;
see Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury,105 U.Pa.L.Rev.139,
143; 54 Colum.L.Rev. 946, 949; 36 Colum.L.Rev. 931, 935.)
[21] Prosecutors have often stated that it is necessary
swiftly and severely to punish the guilty, and such statements
have usually been considered within the bounds of proper
argument. (People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 766 [306 P.2d
463]; People v. Wilson, 61 Cal.App. 611, 628 [215 P. 565] ;
State v. Rhoden (Mo.) 243 S.W.2d 75, 77; Johnson v.
State, 141 Tex. Crim. Rep. 43 [147 S.W.2d 811, 814];
Smith v. State, 74 Ga.App. 777 [41 S.E.2d 541, 551] ; People
V. Wood, 318 Ill. 388 [149 N.E. 273, 274] ; see Levin and Levy,
Persuading the Jury, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 139, 162-163; 54 Colum.
L.Rev. 946, 958.) [22] In the present case, however, the'
prosecutor went beyond merely urging severe punishment.
He stated as a fact the vigorously disputed proposition that
capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than imprisonment. The Legislature has left to the absolute discretion of the jury the fixing of the punishment for first degree
murder. (People V. Green, 47 Ca1.2d 209, 232 [302 P.2d 307] ;
People V. Friend, supra, 767-768.) There is thus no legislative
finding, and it is not a matter of common knowledge, that
capital punishment is or is not a more effective deterrent than
imprisonment. Since evidence on this question is inadmissible,
argument thereon by prosecution or defense could serve no
useful purpose, is apt to be misleading, and is therefore improper. It is true that in Pe.ople v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749,
766-768 [306 P.2d 463], we stated that counsel could advance
"arguments as to which penalty will better serve the objectives of punishment" and listed deterrence of crime as one
of those objectives. To the extent that People v. Friend is
inconsistent with our conclusion herein it is overruled.
That decision, however, was binding on the trial court
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at the time this case was tried, and it would have been an idle
act for defendant to object in the trial court to the prosecutor's argument that capital punishment is a more effective
deterrent than imprisonment. He is therefore not precluded
from raising the question for the first time on appeal. (People
v. Kitchens, 46 Ca1.2d 260, 262-263 [294 P.2d 17], and cases
cited.)
[23a] The prosecutor also asserted without any evidence
in the record that many criminals use empty guns and that
they do so because of fear of the death penalty, and he related
alleged conversations between police and criminals that were
not in evidence. These facts also are not a matter of common
knowledge. (Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392 [45 A.2d
43, 45] ; see Levin and Levy, Per81Ulding the Jury, 105 U.Pa.
L.Rev. 139, 162-163.) [24] Since judicial notice by a jury
is more limited than judicial notice by the trial court (McCormick, Evidence, p. 691), facts are deemed within the
common knowledge of the jury only if they are matters of
common human experience or well known laws of natural
science. (See Commonwealth v. Sykes, supra, 353 Pa. 392
[45 A.2d 43, 45]; McCormick, Evidence p. 691; Levin and
Levy, Persuading the Jury, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 139, 157-167.)
Thus in Commonwealth v. Sykes, supra, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that statistics allegedly indicating that
the number of murders has decreased in states that have
abolished capital punishment were not a matter of common
knowledge and could not be used by defense counsel in his
closing argument.
[25] Although counsel may illustrate a general truth,
the illustration must not degenerate into an improper assertion of specific facts bearing on the case in hand. (See
6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1807, p. 266.) [23b] In
the present case under guise of illustration the prosecutor improperly attempted to furnish specific facts to support his
argument.
[26] Such statements have never been sanctioned; however, since defendant did not object to them, he ordinarily
could not raise the issue of their propriety on appeal unless
they were of such character that the error could not have been
cured by prompt admonition and instructions of the trial
court. (People v. Hampton, 47 Ca1.2d 239, 240 [302 P.2d
300] ; People v. Kirkes, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 719, 725-727; People
v. Sampsell, 34 Ca1.2d 757, 764 [214 P.2d 813]; People v.
Johnson, 153 Cal.App.2d 564, 570-571 [314 P.2d 751].) This
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rule applies to defendants who have refused counsel as well
as to those represented by counsel. (People v. Brajevich, 174
Cal.App.2d 438, 447 [344 P.2d 815].) [27] We cannot
consider the prosecutor's improper statements of fact in the
abstract, however, for they were part and parcel of his erroneous argument with respect to the deterrent effect of the death
penalty.' [28] Moreover, even if that argument were otherwise proper, an admonition to disregard his improper statements of fact would not have cured the error. This is not
a case in which a misstatement of law or of the evidence in
the record could have been corrected by the court or the
prosecutor himself had it been called to their attention. (See
People v. Sampsell, 34 Ca1.2d 757, 763-765 [214 P.2d 813].)
The prosecutor firmly believed that the death penalty is a
more effective deterrent than imprisonment and that the
facts that he advanced in support of his belief were true.
Surely he would not have been willing to recant his statements
had defendant objected, and the trial court could not have
labelled them as erroneous without itself giving inadmissible
hearsay and opinion evidence in support of defendant. At
most it could admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's
statements; it could not erase them from the jurors' minds or
explain why they should not be considered without further
magnifying their impact.
[29] The prosecutor's argument that the death penalty
was essential to deter murder was not a minor part of his
appeal to the jury for that penalty. It was one of the three
main points around which he built his argument, and he supported it with statements of fact he surely should have
known he was not entitled to make. In People v. ltinden,
52 Ca1.2d 1, 27 [338 P.2d 397], we pointed out that error
tending to affect the jury's attitude in fixing the penalty
"implicitly invites reversal in every case. Only under extraordinary circumstances can the constitutional provision [art.
VI, § 4%] save the verdict." We find no such circumstances
in this case, and we are convinced that it is "reasonably probable that a result more favorable" to defendant "would have
been reached in the absence of the error" and that accordingly
the error is prejudicial. (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818,
836 [299 P.2d 243].)
The judgment imposing the death penalty and the order
denyinlr a new trial on the question of penalty are reversed,
Rlld tIle cause is remanded for retrial and redetermination
or the question of penalty only and for the pronouncement of

)
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a new sentence and judgment in accordance with such determination and the applicable law.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.

)

McCOMB, J.-I dissent.
First: I do not believe that the district attorney's argument to the jury constituted prejudicial misconduct.
In my opinion, it is a matter of common knowledge that the
death penalty is a deterrent, because:
(a) Christians and Jews from the beginning of recorded
history have recognized that the death penalty is a deterrent
to murder.
This is demonstrated by the fact that, according to the
account contained in the Old Testament (see New American
Catholic Edition, The Holy Bible (1950», the Lord spoke
to Moses and said: "He that striketh and killeth a man: dying
let him die." (Leviticus 25, verse 17.) "If any man strike
with iron, and he die that was struck: he shall be guilty of
murder, and he himself shall die. If he throw a stone, and
he that is struck die: he shall be punished in the same manner.
If he that is struck with wood die: he shall be revenged by
the blood of him that struck him. . . . These things shall be
perpetual, and for an ordinance in all your dwellings. . . .
You shall not take money of him that is guilty of blood: but
he shall die forthwith." (Numbers 35, verses 16-31.)
(b) In the early history of the western states of the United
States of America, including California, the death penalty
was imposed by the early settlers to stop the rustling of cattle.
It is a matter of common knowledge that in the early days of
this state the apprehension and hanging of cattle rustlers
reduced, and almost stopped, the theft of cattle.
(c) In the early history of San Francisco, law enforcement
broke down and chaotic conditions prevailed. A group of
citizens, known as the Vigilantes, undertook to restore orller.
To do this, they apprehended criminals and after trial
promptly executed the guilty parties. Order was restored, and
the civil authorities assumed control again. Clearly fear of
the death penalty was the basic reason for the restoration of
M~

I

(d) Any prosecuting attorney or criminal defense attorney i
or any trial judge who has sat for a substantial period in a i
department of the superior eourt devoted to the trial of felony.

)
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cases knows that many felons are careful to refrain from arming themselves with a deadly weapon because they do not want
to take the chance of killing anyone and suffering death as
a penalty.
A "few recent examples of the accuracy of this view are to
be found in the following cases involving persons arrested by
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department;·
(i) Margaret Elizabeth Daly, of San Pedro, was arrested
August 28, 1961, for assaulting Pete Gibbons with a knife.
She stated to investigating officers: "Yeh, I cut him and I
should have done a better job. I would have killed him but I
didn't want to go to the gas chamber."
(ti) Robert D. Thomas, alias Robert Hall, an ex-convict
from Kentucky; Melvin Eugene Young, alias Gene Wilson,
a petty criminal from Iowa and Illinois; and Shirley R. Coffee,
alias Elizabeth Salquist, of California, were arrested April
25, 1961, for robbery. They had used toy pistols to force their
victims into rear rooms, where the victims were bound. When
questioned by the investigating officers as to the reason for
using toy guns instead of genuine guns, all three agreed that
real guns were too dangerous, as if someone were killed in the
commission of the robberies, they could all receive the death
penalty.
(iii) Louis Joseph Turck, alias Luigi Furchiano, alias
Joseph Farino, alias Glenn Hooper, alias Joe Moreno, an
ex-convict with a felony record dating from 1941, was arrested
May 20, 1961, for robbery. He had used guns in prior robberies in other states but simulated a gun in the robbery here.
He told investigating officers that he was aware of the California death penalty although he had been in this state for
only one month, and said, when asked why he had only
simulated a gun, I I I knew that if I used a real gun and that
if I shot someone in a robbery, I migltt get the death penalty
and go to the gas chamber."
(iv) Ramon Jesse Velarde was arrested September 26,
1960, while attempting to rob a supermarket. At that time,
armed with a loaded .38 caliber revolver, he was holding
several employees of the market as hostages. He subsequently
escaped from jail and was apprehended at the Mexican border.
While being returned to Los Angeles for prosecution, he made
the following statement to the transporting officers:. "I think I
·The eases eited are taken from the reeords on file in the Los Angeles
Department.
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might have escaped at the market if I had shot one or more
of them. I probably would hatle done it if it wasn't for tM
gas ch4mber. I'll only do 7 or 10 years for this. I don't want
to die no matter what happens, you want to live another day."
(v) Orelius Mathew Stewart, an ex-convict, with a long
felony record, was arrested March 3, 1960, for attempted bank
robbery. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to the
state prison. While discussing the matter with his probation
officer, he stated: "The officer who arrested me was by himself,
and if I had wanted, I could have blasted him. I thought about
it at the time, but I changed my mind when I thought of the
gas chamber."
(vi) Paul Anthony Brusseau, with a criminal record in
six other states, was arrested February 6, 1960, for robbery.
He readily admitted five holdups of candy stores in Los
Angeles. In this series of robberies he had only simulated
a gun. When questioned by investigators as to the reason for
his simulating a gun rather than using a real one, he replied
that he did not want to get the gas chamber.
(vii) Salvador A. Estrada, a 19-year-old youth with a
four-year criminal record, was arrested February 2,1960, just
after he had stolen an automobile from a parking lot by
wiring around the ignition switch. As he was being booked
at the station, he stated to the arresting officers: "I want
to ask you one question, do you think they will repeal the
capital punishment law. If they do, we can kill aU you cop.
and judges without worrying about it."
(viii) Jack Colevris, a habitual criminal with a record
dating back to 1945, committed an armed robbery at a supermarket on April 25, 1960, about a week after escaping from
San Quentin Prison. Shortly thereafter he was stopped by
a motorcycle officer. Colevris, who had twice been sentenced
to the state prison for armed robbery, knew that if brought
to trial, he would again he sent to prison for a long term. The
loaded revolver was on the seat of the automobile beside him,
and he could easily have shot and killed the arresting officer.
By his own statements to interrogating officers, however, he
was deterred from this action because he preferred a pOBB·ible
life sentence to death in the gas chamber.
(iJt) Edward Joseph Lapienski, who had a criminal record
dating back to 1948, was arrested in December 1959 for a
hoidup committed with a toy automatic type pisiol. When
questioned by investigators as to why he had threatened his
victim with death and had not provided himself with. the

(~
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means of carrying out the threat, he stated, II I know that if
I had a real gun ond killed someone, I would get Ihe gas

chamber."
(x) George Hewlitt Dixon, an ex-convict with a long felony
record in the East, was arrested for robbery and kidnaping
committed on November 27, 1959. Using a screwdriver in his
jacket pocket to simulate a gun, he had held up and kidnaped
the attendant of a service station, later releasing him unharmed. When questioned about his using a screwdriver to
simulate a gun, this man, a hardened criminal with many
felony arrests and at least two known escapes from custody,
indicated his fear and respect for the California death penalty
and stated, "I did 'I1ot want to get the gas. I I
(xi) Eugene Freeland Fitzgerald, alias Edward Finley,
an ex-convict with a felony record dating back to 1951, was
arrested February 2, 1960, for the robbery of a chain of candy
stores. He used a toy gun in committing the robberies, and
when questioned by the investigating officers as to his reasons
for doing so, he stated: "I know I'm going to the joint and
probably for life. If I had a real gun and killed someO'l1e, I
would get the gas. I would rather hatle it this way."
(xii) Quentin Lawson, an ex-convict on parole, was arrested
January 24, 1959, for committing two robberies, in which he
had simulated a gun in his, coat pocket. When questioned on
his reason for simulating a gun and not using a real one, he
replied that he did flOt want to kill someo'l1e ond get the death
penalty.
(xiii) Theodore Roosevelt Cornell, with many aliases, an
ex-convict from Michigan with a criminal record of 26 years,
was arrested December 31, 1958, while attempting to hold up
the box office of a theater. He had simulated a gun in his coat
pocket, and when asked by investigating officers why an exconvict with everything to lose would not use a real gun, he
replied, "If I used a real gu'l1 and shot someone, I could lose
my life."
(xiv) Robert Ellis Blood, Daniel B. Gridley, and Richard
R. Hurst were arrested December 3, 1958, for attempted robbery. They were equipped with a roll of cord and a toy pistol.
When questioned, all of them stated that they used the toy
pistol because they did flOt want to kt'll aflyone, as they were
aware that the pe'l1alty for killi'l1g a person in a robbery was
death in the gas chamber.
(e) The people of the State of California have, through
.,their Legislature, 011 many occasions considered whether the
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death penalty should be abolished in this state-this as recently I
as the 1961 session of the Legislature-and in each instance
have come to the conclusion that the death penalty is a deterrent and have retained it. Therefore, the judiciary of this
state is bound to follow the legally expressed will of the .
sovereign people of the State of California.
Second: Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements. Therefore, he cannot raise the issue of their propriety
on appeal unless they were of such character that the error
could not have been cured by prompt admonition and instructions of the trial court. (People v. Hampton, 47 Ca1.2d 239,
240 [3] [302 P.2d 300].) In my opinion, any alleged prejudice
could have been cured by a prompt request for, and the giving
of, an admonition and instructions by the trial judge.
'l'hird: In my opinion, the trial judge properly exercised his
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial on the penalty
phase.
Any judge or attorney who has had trial court experience
knows that a trial judge is not always familiar with all the :
procedural law at the outset of the trial of a case. This is '
particularly true at the present time and is in part due to
the ever-changing rules of law. This view was recently expressed by Honorable Evelle J. Younger, of the Los Angeles
Superior Court, in an address which he delivered before I
the Lawyers Club. The following report on Judge Young- I
er's remarks appeared in one of the Los Angeles legal newspapers: " . . . .
"As an example Judge Younger noted the recent changes
in the rules on admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure. 'We have just recently run the gamut
from the common law rule that such evidence was admissible
in Federal or State courts regardless of how obtained, if of
probative value, to absolute exclusion.' The latest rule of
absolute exclusion was handed down this year in the case of
Dolly Mapp. [Dollree Mapp v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 868 (81 S.Ct.
111, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081).]
"The result of these changes is that it becomes increasingly I
difficult for local peace officers to determine what are, and :
what are not, allowable procedures in 'coping with mounting I
criminal activity.' An arrest, he stated, cannot be justified if i
it shocks the conscience-but whose conscience is the deter- :
mining factorY 'Not the community's. Not the Police Chief's.
. . . Weare talking about the conscience of the Ninth Mem- I
ber of the United States Supreme Court. And, we are not ':
t
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talking about his conscience yesterday; we are talking about
his tomorrow's conscience.'
"If judges and legal scholars have difficulty in defining
due process, one can sympathize with the lonely policeman
patrolling his beat who is expected to make legally correct
split-second decisions, he commented.

"

"The speaker concluded by reiterating, 'We must zealously
guard the rights of individuals; but in protecting the individual charged with crime we should never lose sight of the
rights of society.''' (Metropolitan News, Vol. XXXIX, No.
152 (8/31/61); The Los Angeles Daily Journal, Vol. LXXIV,
No. 175 (9/1/61).)
The result is that a trial judge must rely to a large measure
upon the information furnished him by the attorneys appearing before him. In the present case this was done. After the
trial judge expressed doubts as to his authority to reweigh
the evidence following the jury's fixing of the death penalty,
counsel for defendant pointed out to him that he did have such
authority. Whereupon the judge accepted the view that he
had authority on the motion for a new trial to reweigh the
evidence as to the application of the death penalty. He then
stated that assuming he had such authority, he would deny the
motion, as the penalty was properly imposed, and that this
view was supported by the fact that three juries had imposed
the death penalty for the crime of which defendant was convicted.
The problem presented is not a mere academic one. The
people of this state are faced with an extremely important
situation.
I would affirm the judgment and the order denying the
motion for a new trial.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I concur in the conclusions
stated by Mr. Justice McComb and in his reasoning. I find
it necessary, however, to emphasize my differences with the
majority opinion.
I can understand with the majority that there is a reasonably debatable question as to whether the record affirmatively
and satisfactorily shows that the trial court performed its
full duty to independently weigh the evidl'nce as required
by People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Ca1.2d 321, 328 [1, 2], 330
[9, 10] [325 P.2d 97] and People v. Moore (1960) 53 Ca1.2d
451,454 [2] [348 P.2d 584]. However, construing the record
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favorably to affirmance, as is the duty of a reviewing court,
I am satisfied with Justice McComb's conclusion that the
judgment should be affirmed.
The reversal of a judgment in a case of this character (and
this is a second reversal in the same case) even when clearly
required under establislled law, is in itself a serious matter.
But far transcending the importance of the reversal in adverse
effect on law enforcement, are certain pronouncements in the
opinion (hereinafter quoted) which, whether so intended or
not, constitute an attack on the death penalty. I cannot find
justification in fact or in law for the majority's criticism of the
prosecutor's argument to the Jury regarding the death penalty
or for the pronouncements which constitute an undermining
attack on that penalty.
The majority relate that "For the third time a jury has
fixed defendant's penalty at death for the murder of his
wife. . . . [After the first trial] the trial court granted a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and .
we affirmed. [Citation.] Defendant was again . . . found
guilty . . . ; again the jury fixed the penalty at death. We
affirmed the jUdgment as to the adjudication that defendant is
guilty of murder of the first degree and was sane. . . . We
reversed [McComb, J., and Schauer, J., dissenting] . . . as
to the imposition of the death penalty because of the admission of evidence tending to inflame and prejudice the jury.
(People v. Love [1960] 53 Ca1.2d 843 [350 P.2d 705].)"
The order of the majority in the above referred to reversal
is as follows (p. 858 of 53 Ca1.2d): "The judgment is
reyersed as to the imposition of the death penalty, and the
cause is remanded for retrial and redetermination of the question of penalty only and for the pronouncement of a new
sentence and judgmcnt in accordance with such determination and the applicable law." The applicable law includes
the provision of section 190.1 of the Penal Code, that "Evidence may be presented at the further proceedings on the
issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding the crime,
of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts
in aggravation or mitigati.on of the penalty. The determination of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall be .
. . . on the evidence presented . . . . " (Italics added.)
Yet today the majority rule that (ante, p. 729) "Since it
appears, . . . that the prosecutor committed prejudicial mis-,
conduct in arguing the deterrent effect of the death penalty
to the jur~', the judgment . . . must be reversed."
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What possible rationality can be found in the provision
of section 190.1 that "Evidence may be presented . . . on
the issue of penalty . . . and of any facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty" if evidence and argument cannot
-be addressed to what is then the sole issue in litigation T What
can the words "Evidence . . . in aggravation or mitigation
-of tlle penalty" mean if they do not relate to a basis for
selecting as between the more drastic penalty-the greater
deterrent-and the mitigated one of imprisonment T
I agree with the majority that (ante, p. 725) "TIle court
did not err in dismissing defendant's subpoena for Governor
Brown and Warden Duffy. . . . He had subpoenaed Governor Brown to elieit his views on capital punishment. The
penalties for first degree murder have been fixed by the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 190.) The wisdom or deterrent effect
of those penalties are for the Legislature to determine and are
therefore not justiciable issues. [Manifestly the Legislature has
made the determination.] Hence evidence as to these matters
is inadmissible." Certainly the above holding is correct. But
most assuredly no inference can properly be drawn from that
holding that the Legislature has left any doubt that on its
findings and in its judgment both the death penalty-for its
greater deterrent effect, particularly in aggravated cases-and
so-called life imprisonment-with its lesser effect for mitigated cases-are essential for the protection of society in California.
But in contrast to the law the majority go on to assert that
the judgment here must be reversed and remanded for a new
(fourth) trial on the issue of penalty because: "[The prosecutor] stated as a fact the vigorously disputed proposition
that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than
imprisonment." Would "vociferously" perhaps be a more
accurate adverb than "vigorously'" And since, as the majority already had held, the Legislature has fixed the penalties
for first degree murder and they" are therefore not justiciable
issues, " why should the prosecutor not accept the findings of
the Legislature and the law as to the two alternative penalties,
exactly as he did, and offer evidence and argument pertinent
to the jury's performance of duty, as clearly contemplated by
the Legislature in its enactment of Penal Code sections 190
and 190.1 f
The majority continue: "The Legislature has left to the
absolute discretion of the jury the fixing of the punishment

742

PEOPLE

1).

LoVE

[56 C.2d

for first degree murder [i.e., without any control by the judge
of their discretion but, of course, presumably rationally in the
light of the evidence]. [Citation.] There is thus no legislative
finding, and it is not a matter of common knowledge, that
capital punishment is or is not a more effective deterrent than
imprisonment." The italicized pronouncement, in my view,
is obnoxious to fact and law. Unsupported by statute or prior
decision, it is a blow which appears to be aimed directly
against rational application, and therefore toward ultimate
abolition, of the death penalty. If the quoted italicized pronouncement were true-that there is neither legislative finding nor common knowledge "that capital punishment is or is
not a more effective deterrent than imprisonment" then, of
course, the death penalty should be abolished.
Further implementing its tenet the majority opinion continues: "Since evidence on this question [presumably evidence in aggravation or mitigation of penalty as contemplated
by Pen. Code, § 190.f] is inadmissible, argument thereon
by prosecution or defense eould serve no useful purpose,
is apt to be misleading, and is therefore improper. It is
true that in People v. Friend [1957] 47 Cal.2d 749, 766, 768
[306 P.2d 463], we stated that counsel could advance 'arguments as to which penalty will better serve the objectives of
punishment' and listed deterrence of crime as one of those
objectives. To the extent that People v. Friend is inconsistent
with our conclusion herein it is overruled." (Italics added.)
By the above quoted holdings the majority in effect place
the prosecutor in a forensic strait jacket as to argument for
the greater deterrent. Those holdings also effectually emasculate the provision of Penal Code section 190.1, for the taking
of evidence to aid the jury in making an intelligent and
informed selection as between the alternative, but by no means
equal, penalties of death or imprisonment. In so doing it
appears to me that the majority action trenches upon an
invasion of the legislative province in disregard of the distribution of powers prescribed by California Constitution, article
III, section 1. (Compare Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist.
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 213-221 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d
457]; see also dissenting opinion, pp. 221-224; Civ. Code,
§ 22.3; Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, p. 3209.) To the same end today's
majority also disregard the doctrine of stare decisis in overruling (as above quoted) the decisional law which admittedly
had bound the trial court 8.t the time of trial.
Although overruling the cited decision the majority rely on •
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it as a basis for reversal. They say "That decision [Friend
(1957)], however, was binding on the trial court at the time
this case was tried, and it would have been an idle act for
defendant to object in the trial court to the prosecutor's argument that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent
than imprisonment. He is therefore not precluded from raising the question for the first time on appeaL" The trial court
thus is reversed for following the law as it existed at the time
of trial-and as it also existed at the time of this court's first
reversal of the judgment and remand "for retrial and redetermination of the question of penalty only."
Actually the correct rules, as had been held by this court
in the Friend (1957) decision, relative to the selection of
penalty (as between death and so-called life imprisonment)
are stated or indicated in the now overruled case. Insofar as
appears proper to be quoted here, the opinion in that case declares (p. 764 [8] of 47 Cal.2d): "We note . . . that the
trend is toward the more liberal admission of evidence pertinent only to the selection of penalty. For example, it has become established practice to advise the jury of the facts con.
cerning the possibilities of pardon, commutation, parole, etc.
[Citations.] Obviously, the law pertaining to pardons, commutations and paroles has not the slightest relevancy to the
issue of guilt; it is pertinent only as a fact which may be considered in selecting the penalty to be imposed; i.e., it is evidence which may be considered as relevant to the 'aggravation' or 'mitigation' of punishment in the sense in which those
terms have been used in relation to the selection of penalty .
. . . [P.767 [13].] They [the jury] should be told . . . that
beyond prescribing the two alternative penalties the law itself
provides no standard for their guidance in the selection of the
punishment; . . . that in deciding the question whether the
accused should be put to death or sentenced to imprisonment
for life it is within their discretion alone to determine, each
for himself, how far he will accord weight to the considerations of the several objectives of punishment, of the deterrence of crime, of the protection of society, of the desirability
of stcrn retribution, or of sympathy or clemency, ... "
(Italics in last sentence added.) We pointed out also that
(fn. 8, p. 766) "For some years many courts and writers on
criminal law and penology have held that the purpose of
legally adjudicated punishment is not or should not be vengeance, but rather deterrence of the offender and other prospec-
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tive offenders from crime, . . . " (Italics added.) All of the
foregoing, the majority today brush aside.
Regardless of individual preferences among the justices I
deem it to be the duty of this court to accept the fact that the
:r.egislature has determined that the death penalty, in the cases
wherein it is prescribed, is the strongest deterrent against the
commission of such crimes. The fact that the jury (or the
trial judge) has a final power of determination as to whether
the death penalty or life imprisonment shall be imposed in a
given case is of course not a legislative determination that life
imprisonment is an equally strong deterrent. It merely shows
the concern of the Legislature that liability to suffer the
strongest deterrent be surrounded by the strongest safeguards
for the accused. Even as the death penalty is the strongest
deterrent against murder, so is it also the most effective
protector of the lives of the victims of those who deliberately
choose the commission of crimes of violence as a profession.
That the ever present potentiality in California of the death
penalty, for murder in the commission of armed robbery, 1
each year saves the lives of scores,2 if not hundreds of victims
of such crimes, cannot I think, reasonably be doubted by any
judge who has had substantial experience at the trial court
level wth the handling of such persons. I know that during
my own trial court experience, which although not extensive
in criminal law, included some four to five years (1930-1934)
in a department of the superior court exclusively engaged in
handling felony cases, I repeatedly heard from the lips of
robbers-some amateurs (no prior convictions), some professionals (with priors)--substantially the same story: "I used a
toy gun [or a simulated gun or a gun in which the firing pin
or hammer had been extracted or damaged] because I didn't
want my neck stretched." (The penalty, at the time referred
to, was hanging; death by lethal gas was substituted in 1941.)
II use robbery as the example for discussion because the deterrent
effect of the death penalty for murder in the commission of (or attempt
to commit) robbery is particularly well known among law enforcement
officers who bandle Buch cases at the investigation, arrest, and trial
eourt levels. The point of my discussion, however, is equally applicable
to the deterrent effect of the death penalty againat harming kidnap
victims and against murder committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate arson, rape, burglary, mayhem or lascivious acts upon a
child under the age of 14. (See Pen. Code, ~~ 209, 189, 190, and 288.)
'According to tlle 1958-1960 Report of the Department of Justice tlle
number of robberies reported in California in 1959 was 11,548.
It may be noted also that in the aame year 108,002 burglaries were
reported in this state.
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I, of course, recognize that there are persons who in all
sincerity urge that the death penalty be abolished. They point
to the cases which reach the courts and say: "See, it has not
deterred the commission of these crimes."
Certainly the
potentiality of the penalty is not 100 per cent effective as a
deterrent as to all criminals. But it would be absurd to claim
. that because it did not deter all it did not deter any. As to
each victim of each armed robbery whose life is spared because
that one robber was deterred from killing, I dare say that the
victim and his loved ones would not quibble over the percentage of the deterrent's efficacy.
There are also persons who entertain a conscientious scruple
against any taking of human life. When a person who conscientiously believes that the state should never take a human
life is called upon to take part in the operation of a death
penalty law he, understandably-being conscientious in duty
as well as in personal conviction-will suffer grievously.
Whether he shall advocate repeal of the law would be one
thing; urging forbearance of execution might be another.
But regardless of whether a person has or has not any official
connection whatsoever with law enforcement, and whether he
realizes it or not, the death penalty law is a matter of importance to his safety. Whether any citizen would urge amendment of the law to make its application more swift and sure,
or would repeal it altogether, or change it otherwise, the decision he makes should be of grave concern to him-and to his
neighbors. Certainly each person must live with his own
conscience. It is, however, to be hoped that his decision,
as to any action affecting the death penalty which is motivated
by conscience, will be an enlightened decision; that the decision
he makes will be more than superficially consistent with his
true objective. To make such a decision requires thinkingand information. By information, I mean facts, not theories.
Probably all of us who have thought on the subject-and particularly those of us who have some responsibility in these
cases (even as remote as it is at the appellate level)-devoutly
wish that the death penalty were no longer necessary. But we
have not yet reached the state which Sir Thomas More envisioned. Until a Utopian government has become reality,
organized society (if it is to exist) must continue on the posit
of free will and personal responsibility for one 'schoices of
action (see People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 716, 724 [336
P.2d 492]) with sanctions for crimes appropriate to their
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gravity. A good government owes protection to its law
abiding citizens.
Let us consider further this business of armed robbery.
It is much more profitable, ordinarily, than burglary but it
entails more risk. Robbery means facing the victim and taking the property "from his person or immediate presence
. . . against his will, accomplished by means of force or
fear." (Pen. Code, § 211.) The victim (if not blind and
deaf) is a potential witness. Robbery is "in the first degree"
if "perpetrated by torture or by a person being armed with
a dangerous or deadly weapon. . . ." (Pen. Code, § 211a.)
Other kinds of robbery are of the second degree. Robbery in
the first degree is punishable "by imprisonment in the state
prison . . . for not less than five years;" that of the second
degree, by like imprisonment "for not less than one year."
(Pen. Code, § 213.) The maximum in both cases is life
imprisonment. Few, if any, law-respecting people would contend that these sentences, particularly in view of the early
parole probabilities, are too severe.
The risk of undergoing such a sentence is just as much a
calculated risk of the professional robber as is the risk of
deflation (or competition) a calculated risk of the conventional
businessman. But the robber can do one thing that will vastly
decrease the risk of identification and conviction: he can
eliminate the known witnesses-the victims he robs. To accomplish any robbery he must at least make a show of force and
induce fear; and for that reason he usually carries a gunor something that looks like a gun. It cannot be validly disputed that the choice as to which he carries-a gun or what
looks like a gun-is in case after case controlled solely by his
respect for the death penalty. If the punishment he risks for
robbery is to be imprisonment-and only imprisonment, even
if he eliminates the only witness-it would seem inevitable
that the incentive to kill would be greatly increased. The
greater chance of escaping any punishment would, in the
minds of some at least, outweigh the slighter risk of having
the term increased. Many a robber who would take the risk
of a longer term would absolutely shun any plan which substituted death for imprisonment.
And now I return to the subject of conscientious scruples
against the execution of a human being. From what has
already been said it must be obvious that I understand that
it would be poignantly desirable (in the faithful performance
. of their law enforcement duties) for jurors and trial judges.
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particularly, and also for justices of courts of review, and
governors or other officers having the power of commutation,
if the death penalty were abolished. But I comprehend also
. that it would be tragically undesirable to the families of the
innocent victims who would die violently as a result.
Because of what my own eyes have seen and my ears haye
. heard I cannot doubt the efficacy of the death penalty as a
savior of the lives of victims of robbers, kidnapers, burglars,
and criminals of similar dispositions. But if there were doubt
in my mind I should resolve it in favor of protecting the
innocent victims of the future rather than sparing the guilty
killers of the past.
Inasmuch as today's majority opinion (1) may well be
construed as at least approaching an invitation to the Legislature to repeal the death penalty; (2) as it declares a
proposition which, if accepted, would constitute a basis arguably demanding repeal;8 and (3) as it shackles district attorneys and trial courts in effective administration of the present
law as it was enacted, it may well be that the Legislature
should give attention to the legislation so affected. In that
connection, in view of today's court action and of the entire
record of appeals from penalty determinations under Penal
Code sections 190 and 190.1 (as those sections were, respectively, amended and added by Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, p. 3509,
and Stats. 1959, ch. 738, p. 2727), the Legislature perhaps
will wish to give consideration to the possible desirability of
eliminating the alternative of imprisonment in certain situations to be designated by the Legislature, and making the
greater deterrent the sole penalty, to follow as a matter of
law on final conviction in any such designated situation. It
would seem that, if such action is contemplated, the Legislature in its study might consider whether the greater deterrence of such ccrtainty might reasonably be made applicable
to those who personally would kill, or direct another to kill,
"in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under
Section 288," or in kidnaping. (See Pen. Code, §§ 189, 209.)
Finally, I emphasize: each person who officially or unofficially participates in or advocates enforcement, repeal or
amendment of the subject law-and who receives the benefits
of its protection-must live with his own conscience. But I re'Why, in<leed, slJoultl it not be repealed if, as the mnjority declare, it
is no more of a deterrent to murder than is mere imprisonment!
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spectfully and earnestly urge that he who would consider
repealing or otherwise defeating operation of this law, thc
principal purpose of which is to protect the lives of the victims of crimes of violence, will either make sure that the
. information on which he acts is sound and convincing or will
pause to consider what his conscience may tell him as to some
measure of moral responsibility for the "eliminations" which
reason suggests may thereby be encouraged.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December
1, 1961. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted. The following opinion!;
were then rendered:
SCHAUER, J., and McCOMB, J., Dissenting.-The Attorney General has filed on behalf of the People of California
a petition for rehearing in which he presents facts, law, and
argument supporting his request that this court reconsider
its majority decision filed November 2, 1961. The petition
has been denied but the arguments of the Attorney General
remain fundamentally unanswered.
Such arguments are founded on facts which have been generally recognized in organized society since time immemorial
and on the law of this state as it had existed in all material
respects, until the majority's unprecedented pronouncement,
from at least the time that the Penal Code was adopted in
1872. Only the fiat of the majority denies validity to the
clearly expressed intention (and implied finding) of the I
Legislature (Pen. Code, §§ 190 and 190.1) that evidence and
argument in aggravation of the penalty mean evidence and
argument for the penalty of death, while evidence and argument in mitigation of penalty seek so-called life imprisonment
in contrast to death. How can it be said that a governor can
comm1de a death sentence to imprisonment unless the latter
be a mitigated, i.e., a lesser punishment' A mitigated punishment is, of course, a lesser deterrent than an aggravated
punishment. If this be not true, we should abandon a society
based on the premise that man is a free agent; a fortiori we
should scrap the entire system of modern penology because
it is based on the concept that man is a free moral agent, a
reasoning being responsive to sanctions and benefits. And if !
the aggravated punishment is not a greater deterrent than the !
I
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lesser then it would be simply cruel and unnecessary; hence
it would violate section 6 of article I of our Constitution and
be void.
We observe that as a matter of simple logic the majority's
decision must inevitably tend to encourage murders in the
commission of crimes of violence, hence to increase for every
citizen,· .and .particularly for law enforcement officers, the
hazard of death by violence; further, we note that the opinion
fails to respect the necessarily implied finding of the Legislature as to the deterrent effect of the death penalty, implicit in the express provisions for the trial of the penalty
issue in capital cases (see Pen. Code, §§ 190 and 190.1) which
were enacted following and implementing our decision in
Peop~e v. Friend (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 749, 764 [8], 766 (fn. 8),
767 [13] [306 P.2d 463]. Instead of respecting, the majority
opinion effectually emasculates, the penalty selection provisions of section 190.1 and overrules the decision which the
Legislature had thereby implemented and which concededly
had been the law of this state when the case was tried.
Because the petition for rehearing (aigned by Attorney
General Stanley Mosk, by Assistant Attorney General Doris
H. Maier, and by Deputy Attorney General Raymond M.
Momboisse) so cogently, albeit respectfully, presents the case
for the P(Jlple, and because of the grave import of this decision to peace officers, to the law-abiding public and to the
Legislature, we deem it proper to, and we do, incorporatp.
herein the major portion of the petition, as f"llows:
"This Court has held that it was error for the district
attorney to argue that the death penalty is a more effective
deterrent than life imprisonment as there is no legislative
finding, and it is not a matter of common knowledge, that
capital punishment is or is not a more effective deterrent than
imprisonment. Further: this Court found that it was error
for the prosecutor to assert, without any evidence in the
record, that many criminals use empty guns and that they
do so because of the fear of the death penalty.

"

"Certainly it was the intent of the Legislature in enacting
section 190.1 of the Penal Code to codify the law as expressed
in People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749 [306 P.2d 463], that at
the penalty phase the jury should be fully advised of the
consequences of the penalties which might be imposed.
"This Court in People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, at 765768 [306 P.2d 463], held that to aid the jury to act in-
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telligently in making their selection of the alternative pcnalties, counsel may properly argue their respective views as
to which punishment, under all the circumstances shown,
will be more appropriate and desirable in the cause of justice.
To that end, appeals to reason in the exercise of the jury's
discretion were held to be proper, as were appeals for clemency
or for stern retribution.
"This Court went on to outline the great responsibility
placed upon members of the jury and the difficultness of that
verdict. Naturally in the conscientious discharge of their
duty, jurors are eager to have, and have a right to have given
to them, all the guidance the law can offer. Among thosc
things which this Court at that time felt were essential for
an intelligent determination by the jury were arguments as
to which penalty will better serve the objectives of punishment. Among those objectives this Court recognized deterrents [sic] to the offender, and other prospective offenders.
"P-eople v. Friend was decided on January 25, 1957. In
that same year the Legislature added section 190.1 to the
Penal Code, in which it was provided that there should be a
separate trial to pass on the question of penalty when one of
the alternative penalties was death. At that trial 'Evidence
may be presented . • . of the circumstances surrounding the
crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of
any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.'
"It is presumed that the Legislature at the time it enacted
this statute knew of the decision of this Court in the case of
People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749 [306 P.2d 463] (KtLsior v.
Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603, 618 [7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657]).
"Indeed it could be said, as was beld by this Court in
People v. Nash, 52 Ca1.2d 36, 47 [338 P.2d 416], that it is
apparent the Legislature had in mind the law and presumably
knew of the existing domestic decisional law in this regard
and intended not to change it. Ratber, by utilizing the judicially construed words 'aggravation or mitigation of the
penalty,' the Legislature indicated its intent tbat tbe judicial
definition should continue as the law of this State.
"After the enactment of section 190.1 of the Penal Code
and its amendment in 1959 (Stats. 1959, Ch. 738) tbis Court
in People v. Love, 53 Cal.2d 843, 856 [350 P.2d 705J, indicated tbat the Friend decision still stated the permissible
range on inquiry on the issue of penalty.
"We respectfully suggest that the opinion of this Court in
People v. Friend was correct, that it was adopted by the
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Legislature when it enacted section 190.1 of the Penal Code
and should be the controlling law in this case.
"This Court has repeatedly held that the jury could be
informed of the minimum term a person given a life sentence
for ·first degree murder must serve and the minimum average
and maximum terms actually being served for first degree
murder in California (People v. P1/,rvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 884
[346 P.2d 22] ; People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 755 [306 P.2d
463] ; People v. Green, 47 Ca1.2d 209, 217 [302 P.2d 307]).
The reason put forth by the court was that such matter is
essential in ascertaining the significance of a life sentence
and thus at arriving at an intelligent evaluation of the
penalty to be imposed.
"Certainly the same is equally true when dealing with
deterrent effect of the penalties involved.
"We respectfully suggest that the opinion of this Court
in People v. Friend was correct, and that it is essential that
the jury be advised of the deterrent effect of capital punishment in order that they may intelligently and £'ffectively perform the grave responsibility given to them.
"We are thus confronted with the question of whether or
not capital punishment is a deterrent.
"Logically it is indisputable that death is the greatest deterrent possible and as stated by Justice McComb it is a
matter of common knowledge that th£' death penalty is a deterrent.
"The use of the word 'lawfully' in our criminal statutes
implies that the person knows what he is doing, intends to
do what he is doing, and is a free agent (People v. Trombley,
41 Cal.2d 801, 807 [sic, In re Trombley, 31 Cal.2d 801,807
(193 P.2d 734)]).
"This Court quite recently reaffirmed its belief in the
dignity of man when in People v. Nash, 52 Ca1.2d 36 [338 P.2d
416], at 50, it reiterated the basic premise of all moral and
social order and the cornerstone of criminal law, that man is
a creature possessed of free will, charged with personal responsibility for his choice of action.
"Because man is a free agent and has a free will, it follows
that his choice of aetion will be influenced by the consequences
which will flow {rom it. Thus it follows that punishment for
a crime will deter one from committing a crime. Thus at least
one purpose of the penal law is to express a formal social condemnation of forbidden conduct, and buttress that condemnation by sanctions calculated to prevent that which is for.
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bidden. The ultimate goal is deterrence (Sauer v. United
States, 241 F.2d 640, 9th Cir., p. 648).
"If there is any validity to the theory that the purpose of
legally adjudicated punishment is to deter the commission of
crime, it must follow that death, which is the 'King of
. Terrors' (Job xviii, 14), which is the extreme penalty and
. is so generally considered (People v. Gomez, 209 Cal. 296,
300 [286 P. 998]), is the most effective deterrent.
"Certainly no one can seriously argue that insofar as the
particular individual involved, capital punishment is without peer in its deterrent effect.
"Insofar as its deterrent effect on others, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in its report concluded that
, Prima facie the penalty of death is likely to have a stronger
effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other
form of punishment, and there is some evidence (though no
convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so' (pagc
24).
"Further proof of the effectiveness of the death penalty
is to be found in answers to questionnaires circulated by the
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on Capital Punishment and found in its report pertaining to the problems of
the death penalty and its administration in California. The
overwhelming majority of judges, district attorneys and
police officers were of the opinion that the death penalty
should be retained. These are the men who are best qualified
to arrive at such conclusion, for they are the individuals
who are in direct contact with the criminal element in our
society.
"Probably one of the best statements of this is the following remark of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen:
"'No other punishment deters men so effectually from
committing crimes as the punishment of death. This is one
of those propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply
because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof
can make them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing
against it, but that is all. The whole experience of mankind
is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the
one to which resort has always been made when there was an
absolute necessity for producing some result. . . . No one goes
to certain inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the
matter the other way. Was there ever yet a criminal who, !
when sentenced to death and brought out to die, would refuse I
the offer of a commutation of his sentence for the severest :
I
!
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secondary punishment' Surely not. Why is this T It can
only be becausc "All that a man has will he give for his life."
In any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope;
but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more
forcibly.' (Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 19491953 Report, page 19.)
"Indeed, as stated by Justice Schauer in his dissent, if
capital punishment is not a more effective deterrent than imprisonment, it must be abolished. Actually it would have
been abolished before now, for history clearly establishes the
fact that disproportionate penalties shock human feelings and
result in the equalization of crime and punishment. Thus
over the years the death penalty has been limited to crimes of
great atrocity and danger to society which cannot otherwise
be effectually guarded against.
"This principle has been recognized by our courts for it
has been held that the Legislature may classify crimes and
prescribe severer punishment for the commission of one class
than for another as a deterrent against the commission of
the more heinous crimes (People v. Smith, 218 Cal. 484, 489
(24 P.2d 166J).
"This certainly is reflected in the codes of the State of
California wherein the Legislature imposes the death penalty
only for the crimes of treason against the State (Pen. Code
sec. 37), procuring the execution of an innocent person
(Penal Code sec. 128), first degree murder (Penal Code secs.
189 and 190), train wrecking (Penal Code sec. 219), kidnaping with bodily harm (Penal Code sec. 209), and an aggravated assault by a life prisoner (Penal Code sec. 4500).
"Indeed, section 209 of the Penal Code is particularly
demonstrative of the conclusion of the Legislature that the
death penalty is by far a more effective deterrent than life
imprisonment, for there when the person kidnaped suffers
bodily harm, the punishment is to be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death, whereas in those instances where the victim does not suffer bodily harm, the
punishment is only imprisonment for life with the possihility
of parole. This is proof that the Legislature recognizes that
the death penalty is a more effective deterrent than mere life
imprisonment.
"Likewise, as pointed out in both of the dissents, the
People of the State of California have constantly been called
upon in recent years through the Legislature to abolish the
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death penalty. In each instance the conclusion has been that
the death penalty is a deterrent and it has been retained.
"In the same vein, it is interesting to note that the People
of the State of California have not been directly offered the
opportunity to express their view in an election as to whether
or not the death penalty should be abolished.
"It seems only reasonable to conclude that if the proponents
of abolition believed that the majority of the people of this
State did not believe in capital punishment, that they would
at least attempt to submit the matter to a popular vote. The
failure to do 80 is the best proof that even the advocates of
abolishment are convinced that the majority of the people
of this State believe that it is an effective deterrent and desire
its retention.
"Historically it has been demonstrated that capital punishment is a most effective deterrent. Little can be added to the
excellent summaries of history to be found in the dissents
filed in this case. They vividly pointed out that throughont
the history of Christians and Jews, and more particularly
throughout the history of California, the death penalty has
been universally considered and has proven to be the most
effective deterrent.
"In addition to the effectiveness of the vigilantes referred
to in the dissent of Justice McComb, we might add that
similar activity in New Orleans in the 1890s resulted in an
equally effective deterrent to crime.
"The best summary of our argument is found in these
words . . . 'it is a matter of common knowledge that the
death penalty is a deterrent.'
"In reference to that portion of the district attorney's
argument wherein he stated that it is a known recognized
fact that criminals will carry toy guns or unloaded guns because of the death penalty, we respectfully submit that this
is legitimate argument, for it is history and a matter of
common knowledge.
"In the dissent by Justice McComb numerous specific cases
have been set forth which prove this argument is a correct
reflection of history, as does the personal experience of Justice
Schauer.

"

"In the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report
it was stated: 'From them we received virtually unanimous
evidence, in both England and Scotland, to the effect that
they were convinced of the uniquely deterrent value of capi-
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tal punishment in its effect on professional criminals. On
these the fear of the death penalty may not only have the
direct effect of deterring them from using lethal violence to
accomplish their purpose, or to avoid detection by silencing
the victim of their crime, or to resist arrest. It may also
have the indirect e1Iect of deterring them from carrying a
weapon lest the temptation to use it in a tight corner should
prove irresistible. These witnesses had no doubt that the
existence of the death penalty was the main reason why lethal
violence was not more often used and why criminals in this
country do not usually carry firearms or other weapons. They
thought that, if there were no capital punishment, criminals
would take to using violence and carrying weapons; and the
police, who are now unarmed, might be compelled to retaliate'
(page 21).
"Likewise, in the appendix to that report, page 335, specific
instances were cited which confirm those set forth in Justices
McComb's and Schauer's dissents.
"In our own state a hearing was held before the Senate
Committee on JUdiciary on March 9, 1960. That hearing was
telecast in its entirety and was subsequently released as a
printed report.
"During that hearing a report from the Los Angeles Police
Department entitled, 'Employees Report, Robbery Suspects
in Committing Capital Offenses' was introduced. That report showed that a number of defendants in conversations
with reporting officers stated that they either had (1) toy
guns, (2) empty guns, or (3) simulated guns, rather than
taking a chance on getting the gas chamber.
"Likewise the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, Mr. Pitchess,
in his presentation referred t.o specific instances where suspects had admitted that they had not armed themselves for
fear of the death penalty. Likewise a tape was played to
the committee in which a suspect had stated that a crime
committed by him had been with a gun from which the firing
pin had been removed so that no one would be injured, because he did not want to get the gas chamber (Report of the
Senate Committee on Judiciary, March 9, 1960, pp. 149-153).
"Likewise Mr. Coakley, the District Attorney of Alameda
County, informed the committee that any chief of police
or sheriff or district attorney in any large community has
had the same experience of talking to robbers who had told
them they used a gun which was inoperative because of fear
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of the death penalty (Report of the Senate Committee on
Judiciary, March 9, 1960, p. 156).
"Testimony to the same effect was elicited from Chief of
Police Parker of Los Angeles (Report of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, March 9, 1960, p. 161).
"In an article appearing in 35 State Bar of California
Journal one of the outstanding defense attorneys of the State,
Mr. Leo R. Friedman, stated:
" 'The foregoing claims (that capital punishment was not
a deterrent) cannot be reconciled with the numerous cases
of robbery. bank stick-Ups, burglaries, etc., where the criminal
used an unloaded gun or a toy pistol. Such criminals were
willing to take a chance on being caught and imprisoned,
but would not take a chance on killing the victim and being
executed.
" 'Naturally, there can be no statistics produced to demonstrate how many murders were not committed because the
would-be perpetrator feared the death penalty. If but one
or two innocent lives are saved each year because the death
penalty has deterred the commission of a murder, then the
death penalty is justified. No one can successfully deny that
the fear of the death penalty has saved innocent lives.'
"The numerous specific instances are all part of the history
of this State and they show that among the professional
criminals capital punishment is a deterrent and because of it,
he commits crimes armed with a toy or inoperative gun. Thus
it was proper for the district attorney to so argue to the
jury."
For all the reasons stated in our dissents to the majority
decision and for the further reasons so ably presented for
the People by the Attorney General. the petition for rehearing
should be granted.
GIBSON, C. J., TRAYNOR, J., PETERS, J., WHITE, J.,
and DOOLING, J.-The dissenting opinion to the order denying rehearing requires this response.
We held in this case that it was prejudicial error for the
prosecutor in a murder case to assert that the death penalty
is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment when
there was no evidence to that effect in the record and to bolster
that assertion with statements of fact of which there was likewise no evidence in the record.
The wisdom and deterrent effect of the death penalty are
for the Legislature to determine, and are therefore not justici-
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able issues. Hence our holding that evidence thereon was inadmissible. Juries in capital cases are not legislatures ad hoc
and trials on the issue of penalty are not to be converted into
legislative hearings. Were it otherwise, counsel for both sides
could prolong as well as confuse the trial on the issue of
. penalty with a tangle of conflicting evidence on the vigorously
. disputed proposition that the death penalty is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment. Even the dissenters
agree that "certainly the . . . holding is correct" that the
"wisdom or deterrent effect of [the penalties of first degree
murder] are for the IJegislature to determine and are therefore not justiciable issues. Hence evidence as to these matters
is inadmissible. "
The People argue that "it is proper to advise a jury of the
effect of the various penalties between which they must
choose, for only if such is done can the jury arrive at an
intelligent determination of which penalty to impose." In
support of this argument cases are cited holding that it is
proper to inform the jury of the minimum term that a person
given a life sentence for first degree murder may serve.
What the petition for rehearing fails to recognize is that
the basis of the argument permitted on the minimum term
that may be served on a life sentence is the introduction of
evidence to support such argument. Once we concluded that
evidence of the comparative deterrent effect of the respectj'qe
sentences was not admissible, it necessarily followed that argument on the subject would not be proper unless we could say
as a matter of common knowledge that the death penalty is
the more effective deterrent. We could not so conclude when
it is common knowledge instead that there is vigorous dispute
whether capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than
life imprisonment.
Thus "Whether or not the death penalty more effectively
deters the crime of murder than would any other punishment
is the most hotly debated question within the capital punishment policy issue." (Ohio Legislative Service Commission,
Capital Punishment, Staff Research R.eport No. 46, January,
1961, p. 31.) This conclusion is documented in numerous
studies by penologists, criminologists, legislative committees,
and others. (See, for example, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953; Report of California
Senate Committee on Judiciary :March 9, ] 960; .Assembly·
Interim Committee Reports, 1955-1957, Report of Subcommittee of the JUdiciary Committee 011 Capital Punishment

),

I
758

)

)

PEOPLE

v.

LoVE

[56 C.2d

Pertaining to the Problems of the Death Penalty and Its
Administration in California; Thorsten Sellin, The Dcath
Penalty-A Report for the Model Penal Project of the American Law Institute (1959); Sir Ernest Gowers (Chairman of
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment), A Life for a
Life (1956); Bennett (Director of Bureau of Prisons, U.S.
Department of Justice), Delaware Abolishes Capital Punishment, 44 ABAJ 1053; Gardner (Chairman of the General
Council of the Bar of England and Wales), Capital Punishment in Britain, 45 ABAJ 259; Savitz, A Study in Capital
Punishment, 49 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and
Police Science 338; George Ryley Scott, The History 0/ Capital Punishment (1951); E. Roy Calvert, Capital Punishment
in the Twentieth Century (1927); Capital Punishment
(1961), the National Council, Episcopal Church; Zilborg, The
Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment (1954);
Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46
J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 347, 353-354; The Deterrent Influence
0/ the Death Penalty in Murder and tlte Penalty 0/ Death,
284 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, p. 62; Morris, Thoughts on Capital Punishment, 35 Wash. L. Rev. 335.)
The Legislature has taken care not to express a preference
for one penalty or the other. Instead it has left to the absolute
discretion of the jury the fixing of the punishment for first
degree murder. It bears noting that reasons other than deterrence have been advanced in support of the death penalty,
such as retribution, and the protection of society from further
harm from the defendant. It is a far-fetched speculation that
the Legislature, by leaving it to the jury to impose one penalty
or the other, has indicated that the death penalty is a more
effective deterrent than life imprisonment.
It is a baseless fear that the preclusion of arguments to
the jury on a question they cannot properly evaluate without
evidence will encourage murders in the commission of crimes
of violence. The Penal Code provides for the death penalty.
A criminal will hardly be emboldened to take a risk so grave
because of a ruling that neither the defendant nor the prosecutor can introduce evidence or argue to the jury that one or
the other of the penalties prescribed is the more effective
deterrent.
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